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[L. A.'No. 27535. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1964.]
BROWN DERBY HOLLYWOOD CORPORATION, Plaintift' and Appellant, v. JOSEPH HATTON et aI., Defendants and Respondents.
II] Adjoining Landowners-Encroachments-InjunctioDS. .....,.In an
action between adjoining landowners, when defendant without
privilege occupies plaintiff's property, an injunction is granted
to remove the encroachment, but where the encroachment does
not irreparably injure plaintiff, was innocently made, and
where the cost of removal would be great compared to the
inconvenience caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may, in its discretion, deny the
injunction and compel plaintiff to accept damages.
[2] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-That an action to enjoin
an encroachment is between adjoining lessees of a common
landowner does not make inapplicable the rule that an injunction should be granted to remove the encroachment in the
absence of facts that would allow an equity court, in its discretion, to deny the injunction and compel plaintiff to accept
damages, since the rationale behind the rule is not to prevent
injury to the freehold but to prevent a wrongdoer from gaining control of land merely by paying a penalty of damages,
and the landowner's consent to the encroachment cannot prevent the tenant in possession from asserting during his term
of years his right to protect the land against trespassers.
[3] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-In an action by one lessee
to enjoin an encroachment by an adjoining lessee from the
same lessor, the court might have difficulty in finding irreparable injury to justify an injunction if plaintiff lessee has
only a short-term interest, but when the court finds that there
is such injury or that defendant lessee was not innocent, it
should grant an injunction.
[4] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-Where an action to enjoin
an encroachment is not one in which the public interest is
involved, the court can readily grant an injunction if defendant was :o.ot innocent.
[6] Id.-Encroachments-Injunctions.-In an action to enjoin an
encroachment by defendantf defendant is not innocent if he
wilfully encroached on plaintiff's land; to be wilful defendant
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adjoining Landowners, § 9 et seq.; Am.Jur.

2<1, Adjoining Landowners, § 128 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-8] Adjoining Landowners, § 11.
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must not only know that he is building on plaintiff's land, .
but must also act without a good faith belief that he has a "
right to do 80.
[6] 14.-Encroacbments-Injunctions-Appeal.-In an action to
enjoin an encroachment by defendant, where the evidence on
the question of defendant's good faith in' constructing the
encroachment was in conflict, it was reversible error for the
trial court to fail to make a finding on the issue of whether
defendant acted in good faith, or in wilful disregard of plaintiff's rights hoping that a court would allow the atructure to
remain and grant only a remedy of damages.
[7] Id.-Encroacbments-Injunctions.-In an action by one lessee
to enjoin an encroachment constructed by another lessee from
a common lessor on land under a long-term lease to plaintiff,
it was not error to find that plaintiff did not suffer irreparable
injury and that defendant's hardship outweighed plaintiff's,
despite the fact that plaintiff might make use of the land
involved before its lease expires, where plaintiff did not claim
that any of its present plans were hampered by the encroachment, thus permitting the court to rely on the present use
and nature of the land in ascertaining whether there was
irreparable injury.
[8] Id.-Encroacbments-Injunctions-Damages.-If, on retrial of
an action by a lessee to enjoin an encroachment by defendant,
also a lessee from the same lessor, but for a shorter term, the
court awards damages in lieu of an injunction, relief should
be granted to protect plaintiff throughout the course of its
lease rather than for the duration of 'defendant's lease.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Reversed with '
directions.
Action for a mandatory injunction to compel removal of
an encroachment on property leased by plaintiff and for a
declaration of rights and duties under a lease and a sublease.
Judgment denying injunctive relief and awarding monetary
damages to plainti1f against defendant lessee reversed with
directions.
Frank J. Kanne, Jr., for Plainti1f and Appellant.
Russell E. Parsons, MacFarlane, Schaefer &; Haun, Russell
R. Pratt, Henry Schaefer, Jr., William Gamble, E. J. Caldecott and Jerol R. Hodges for Defendants and Respondents.,
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1945, Elizabeth Haun 1 leased a
building at 1610 North Vine Street in Los Angeles to defendant Joseph Hatton that he used as a restaurant. Elizabeth
Hann also owned adjacent property to the north and east of
this building that she leased to System Auto Parks as a parking lot. Shortly after defendant Hatton started his restaurant, he began using a strip of the land leased to System
Auto Parks for the storage of garbage. This strip, approximately 5 feet by 48 feet. was adjacent to defendant Hatton's
building. System Auto Parks did not object to this practice
and in 1947 erected four or five iron posts marking the strip.
In 1951, Mrs. Hann leased the parking lot to defendant
Broadway Hales Stores until 1980. The lease provided that
the tenant of the adjacent building (defendant Hatton) could
enter on the land at reasonable hours for the removal of
garbage. In 1952, Broadway subleased the property for the
remainder of its term to plaintiff, Brown Derby Hollywood
Corporation. The sublease contained the same privilege of
entry as the lease to Broadway. Defendant Hatton entered
into a new lease in 1954 that expires in 1969.
From 1945 to 1961, defendant Hatton used the 5-foot strip
to store garbage,. and no objection was made by plaintiff or
its predecessors. After the iron posts were knocked down by
automobiles in 1954 or 1955, plaintiff had a white line painted
to mark the strip. In 1961, the Los Angeles Health and
Fire Departments notified defendant Hatton that he could
not continue the uncovered and unenclosed storage of garbage
on the strip because of the odor and fire danger. He negotiated unsuccessfully with plaintiff for additional space, and
then, with the approval of his lessor, Mrs. Haun, began con- .
struction of an extension of his building that enclosed the
strip. One week after the work began, plaintiff's attorney sent
a letter to defendant Hatton protesting the encroachment on
plaintiff's property and demanding that the work be stopped.
Hatton disregarded this notice, and the building was completed two weeks later. The extension was made largely of
brick and cost approximately five thousand dollars.
On December 13, 1961, plaintiff brought this action seeking
a mandatory injunction compelling defendant Hatton to remove the extensio~ and asking for a declaration of rights
and duties under the lease between defendants Haun and
Broadway and the sublease between Broadway and plaintiff.
lElizabeth HauD, now deceased, ill represented b,. Ra:ymond HaUD as
the exeeutor of her will.
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The trial court found that defendant Hatton had acquired"
no right by prescription or otherwise to construct the ~- '
sion on the land subleased to plainti«. Finding that monetary
,damages would be adequate, the court denied the injunetion
, and awarded damages of $728.79 against defendant Batton
to cover the period until March 31, 1969, when his J.eue \'
expires, and entered judgment for defendants Baun and '
Broadway. Plaintiff appeals.
[1] In an action between adjoining landowners, when the
defendant without privilege occupies the plainti«'s property,
an injunction'is granted to remove the encroachment. (Phil- f
lips v. Isham, 111 Cal.App.2d 537 [244 P.2d 716].) But
",vhere the encroachment does not irreparably injure the
plaintitI, was innocently made, and where the cost of remqval
would be great compared to the inconvenience caused plaintitI
by the continuance of the encroachment, the equity court may,
in its discretion, deny the injunction and compel the plaintiff
to accept damages." (Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal.App.2d
554, 559 [250 P.2d 660]; see Dolske v. Gormley, 58 Cat2d
513 [25 Cal.Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174]; PahZ v. Ribero, 193
Ca1.App.2d 154, 163 [14 Cal.Rptr. 174]; Baglione v. Le!U,
160 Ca1.App.2d 731, 734 [825 P.2d 471J.) [9] Defendant
Hatton contends that this rule, designed -for cases of injur.y
to the freehold, does not apply to situations like the present
one in which the action is between lessees of a common landowner. This contention is without merit. The rationale b&hind the rule is not to prevent injury to the freehold but to
prevent a wrongdoer from gaining control of land merely by
paying a penalty of damages. The tenant in possession during
his term of years is entitled to protect his land against trespassers (Strohlburg v. Jones, 78 Cal. 381 [20 P. 705]), and
to obtain an injunction, if necessary, to protect his interest
(Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 765 [116 P. 46, Ann.Cas. 19120
1125] ; Hmlbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. -426
[17 P. 535]). The consent of the landowner to the encroachment cannot prevent the tenant from asserting his rigbtl,
for a landowner cannot interfere with his tenant's pOSSe!!8inn
or ~njoyment by allowing others to enter upon the land.
(Bessho v. General Petroleum Corp., 186 Cal. 183 [199 P.
22].) [3] If the lessee has only a short-term interest, the
court might have difficulty in finding irreparable injury to
justify an injunction. When the court finds, however, that
there is such injury or that the defendant was not innocent,
it should grant an injunction.
The issue in the present case is, then, whether the trial
III'i;
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court erred in finding that none of the factors existed that
would necessitate an injunction. [4] Plaintiff contends that
an injunction should be grantcd because defendant Hatton
was not innocent. This case is not one in whieh the public
interest is involved (Ukhtomski v. Twga Mutual Water Co.,
12 Cal.,App.2d 726 [55 P.2d 1251]). The court can therefore
readily grant an injunction if plaintiff's contention is correct.
[6] The defendant is not innocent if he wilfully encroaches on the plaintiff's land. (Christensen v. Tucker, supra,
114 Cal.App.2d 554, 563; Agmar v. Solomon, 87 Cal.,App.
127, 142 [261 P. 1029].) To be wilful the defendant must
not only know that he is building on the plaintiff's land, but
act without a good faith belief that he has a right to do so.
(Oertel v. Copley, 152 Cal.App.2d 287 [313 P.2d 105].)
Thus, if plaintiff in the present case induced defendant
Hatton to believe that he had a right to act, defendant's claim
of good faith is supported. On the other hand, continuation of construction after objection by plaintiff suggests
lack of good faith. (Dunsmuir v. B~7,va, 154 Cal.App.2d 825
[317 P.2d 653] ; Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 688689 [139 P.2d 976] j Felsefithal v. Warring,40 Cal.,App. 119,
128 [180 P. 67J.)
[6] The. evidence on the question of good faith is in
con1lict. Plaintiff contends that defendant Hatton knew that
he was building on the land leased to plaintiff, that he was
told before construction that he had no permission to do so,
and that a warning was sent one week after construction
began demanding that the work be stopped. Plaintiff also
points to evidence that part of the addition was used as a .
dining room to prove that defendant Hatton did not have a
good faith belief he was acting under a prescriptive right to
store garbage. Defendant Hatton insists, however, that he
acted under a good faith belief that he had a prescriptive
right to build on the land and that plaintiff made statements
encouraging this belief. He contends that plaintiff's acceptance of payment for the workers' parking of equipment
during the construction and the fact that it gave him only
one warning after the building was substantially completed
contributed to his good faith belief. In the face of this conflict, the tria' court stated only that the encroachment was
no mere inadvertence and that plaintiff did not expressly
consent to the construction. These findings are not conclusive.
Defendant's action can be intentional and yet be innocent if he
acted in good faith. Moreover, plaintiff could have induced

a
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defendant's good faith belief without expressly consenting.
The crucial issue is: Did defendant Hatton act in good faith
or did he act in wilful disregard of plaintiB's rights hoping
that a court would allow the structure to remain and grant
only a remedy of damages' Since the trial court failed to
make a finding on this crucial issue, the judgment must be
reversed.
[7] Plainti1f also contends that the trial court erred in
finding no irreparable injury and that defendant Hatton'.
hardship clearly outweighed that of plaintiB. It argues that '
although the strip of land bas not been used, plainti1f might
make use of it before its lease expires in 1980. It might con- \
struct a building or doubledeck the parking area since its
use of the lot is not restricted to a parking lot. This case is
not one, however, in which the plaintiff contends that any
of its present plans are ~ampered by the encroachment. (See 1
PahZ v. Rt.oero, supra, 193 Ca1.App.2d 154.) The trial court :
therefore properly relied on the present use and nature of the
land in ascertaining whether there is irreparable injury.
(BagUone v. Leue, supra, 160 Ca1.App.2d 781, 785; Chris.;
tensen v. Tuc'ker, 8Upra, 114 Cal.App.2d 554, 557; Nebel v.
Guyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 80 [221 P.2d 837].)
[8] Finally, plaintift contends that the judgment does
not award damages for the "whole wrong." It contends that
since it was awarded damages only until 1969, when defendant
Hatton's lease terminates, it is not protected until 1980, when
its own sublease ends. In its memorandum opinion, the trial
court stated that plaintiff could make a proper adjustment
with the common lessor Haun and the sublessor Broadway to
cover the period until 1980. It made no finding, however,
declaring the rights of the parties in this regard. If damages
in lieu of an injunction are awarded on retrial, relief should
be granted to protect plaintiff throughout the course of its
sublease.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the
trial court with instructions to determine on the basis of the
evidence previously presented and such additional evidence·
as may be presented by the parties whether or not the encroach~ent was· innocently made.
McComb, J., Peters, y., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Kosk, J.,
and Schauer, J.,. concurred.
*Betbed oTustice of the Supreme Court llittinJr uder usipment 1»7
the Chairman of the oTllclie.ial Council.
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